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RESTORING TRADE’S SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
Frank J. Garcia* & Timothy Meyer** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
As we write, the United States, Canada, and Mexico are meeting in 
Washington, D.C. to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). These talks—and their possible failure—represent the biggest shift 
in U.S. economic policy in a generation. Since NAFTA came into force in 
1994, it has transformed the North American economy. NAFTA has made 
possible continent-wide supply chains, in industries like the auto sector, that 
have reduced costs and allowed American automakers to remain competitive; 
it has opened markets for American agriculture; it has greatly increased the 
standard of living in Mexico; and it has reduced consumer prices across the 
continent. Despite these gains, President Trump has repeatedly threatened to 
pull the United States out of NAFTA if he cannot get a deal that is “fair” for 
American workers. These repeated threats, coupled with aggressive U.S. 
government proposals to roll back liberalization in NAFTA 2.0, have sent the 
Canadian and Mexican governments and the U.S. business community 
searching for new policy ideas to save free trade.  
Restoring Trade’s Social Contract answers this call by proposing a financial 
transaction tax (FTT) in NAFTA and future trade agreements. The tax, no 
more than .1% of the value of securities or currency sales within the free trade 
area, would raise revenue to fund an expansion of adjustment assistance for 
workers who are displaced due to trade liberalization. An Economic 
Development Chapter in NAFTA and future trade agreements would mandate 
that this revenue be spent on expanded domestic trade adjustment assistance 
programs, such retraining, relocation assistance, and infrastructure investment.  
Our proposed tax would thus directly harness the wealth-creating 
potential of trade agreements and explicitly tie funding for adjustment 
assistance to major financial institutions, the parties benefitting the most from 
trade agreements. In so doing, it would restore what we term the social contract 
of trade—a bargain whereby trade liberalization occurs in a way that ensures 
that the least well off among us are, at a minimum, not harmed. Despite its 
huge contributions to poverty reduction and increased human welfare since 
World War II, trade liberalization has contributed to significant job losses, 
leading to economic calamity and social disruption in industrial heartlands 
from the mid-Western United States to Manchester, England and Wallonia, 
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Belgium. These economic losses, in turn, have spurred the political backlash 
that now threatens the international economic order. Securing the long-term 
benefits of trade liberalization for ourselves and our fellow citizens—making 
free trade politically sustainable—thus requires including in trade law itself 
measures to address these significant costs. With NAFTA talks ongoing and 
the United States debating tax reform, the time is right for an FTT dedicated 
to expanded adjustment assistance.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
As we write this, U.S. trade policy is falling into deeper and deeper 
disarray. The United States, Canada, and Mexico are holding frenzied 
meetings to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). As recently as October 11, President Trump has warned that he 
will withdraw the United States from NAFTA if he does not get a deal that 
is “fair” to American workers.1  Indeed, the Trump Administration has 
already pulled the United States out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP); 
threatened to withdraw from the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS);2 and is holding the World Trade Organization’s vaunted dispute 
resolution process hostage to its demands for change.3   
Despite their radical departure from conventional U.S. policy, the 
Administration’s actions enjoy strong support in the states that voted for 
President Trump, as well as from labor interests such as the AFL-CIO that 
traditionally align with the Democratic Party.4 This unprecedented political 
reconfiguration reminds us that today many Americans, regardless of party 
affiliation, feel betrayed by our current trade policies. They believe that free 
trade is imposed on them, at their cost and for others’ benefit.  In short, the 
political consensus in favor of liberalized trade has collapsed.5  
This political discord harms all of us. It poses a serious obstacle to 
further economic liberalization and growth, without effectively addressing 
any of the challenges arising from automation and global production chains.  
At the heart of this crisis, however, lies an opportunity. Free trade’s 
defenders—including the Canadian and Mexican governments and the U.S. 
                                                
1 Ken Thomas, Trump, Trudeau Meet at the White House Amid New NAFTA Talks, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/trump-trudeau-meet-at-the-white-house-amid-new-nafta-
talks/2017/10/11/31fd032c-aeaf-11e7-9b93-
b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.236bc85a558d. 
2 Damian Paletta, Trump Preparing Withdrawal from South Korea Trade Deal, a 
Move Opposed by Top Aides, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/02/trump-plans-withdrawal-
from-south-korea-trade-deal/?utm_term=.03a5596661bf. 
3 See Dispute Settlement Body, Draft Annual Report ¶ 2.2 (2017) (noting concerns by 
WTO members with “linking the discussion of the systemic issues raised by the United 
States to the Appellate Body selection process.”), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=239436,239419,239440,239442,239441,239443,2
39413,239407,239408,239412&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=5&FullTextHash=371857150&
HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.  
4 See infra Part I,.  
5 Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. 985 (2017). 
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business community—are searching for concrete policy proposals that can 
rescue agreements like NAFTA and pave the way for 21st century trade 
policy. In this Essay, we propose three: 1) reforming domestic trade 
adjustment assistance (TAA) in the United States; 2) incorporating 
obligations to provide such assistance into free trade agreements; and most 
importantly, 3) funding adjustment assistance policies through a financial 
transactions tax embedded in free trade agreements like NAFTA and 
applied throughout a free trade area.  
We begin in Part I by explaining the social contract of trade—a 
bargain whereby trade liberalization occurs in a way that ensures that the 
least well off among us is, at a minimum, not harmed. International trade is 
crucial to any country's economic growth and stability.6 But the 
fundamental nature of international trade has been misunderstood or 
misrepresented, contributing to the political crisis that we now find 
ourselves in.7 Despite its huge contributions to poverty reduction and 
increased human welfare since World War II, trade liberalization has 
dramatic distributional implications, both across countries and within 
countries. Reducing trade barriers for manufactured goods has contributed 
to significant job losses, leading to economic calamity and social disruption 
in industrial heartlands from the mid-Western United States to Manchester, 
England and Wallonia, Belgium.8 Moreover, jobs of similar quality have 
not, as promised, emerged in these regions to replace those lost.9 Securing 
the long-term benefits of trade liberalization for ourselves and our fellow 
citizens—making free trade politically sustainable—requires including in 
trade law itself measures to address these significant costs.  
This principle has deep roots in both philosophy and economics, 
including arguments for trade liberalization.10 It ensures that even those 
who do not perceive themselves to benefit from trade liberalization per se 
should nevertheless consent to it. In so doing, it protects the incredible 
                                                
6 For a recent review of the argument for and against free trade as currently managed, 
see Meyer, supra note 5.  
7 FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE AND CONSENT: TRADING FREELY IN A GLOBAL MARKET 
(forthcoming 2018). For an earlier treatment, see FRANK J. GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THREE TAKES 205–272 (2013) (discussing trade’s 
consensual nature). 
8 Cf. David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock: Learning 
from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205 (2016) 
(“Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment 
costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in the local labor 
markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are concentrated. 
Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force 
participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated.”).  
9 Id.  
10 See infra Part I.A.  
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benefits that flow from trade liberalization. Fifty-five years ago, at the 
opening of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, our leaders 
understood trade policy in this way.11  
Parts II and III explain how modern trade policy can reclaim that vision. 
First, we should reform domestic TAA, a collection of programs in the 
United States designed to support workers who lose their jobs due to 
competition from imports (Part II.A). Since 1962, TAA—which purports to 
provide displaced workers with the re-training and relocation necessary to 
rebuild their lives and their communities—has been the primary vehicle 
through which we vindicate our responsibility to help those harmed by trade 
liberalization. Yet despite its critical role, TAA is widely acknowledged to 
have failed as currently implemented.12 TAA should be refashioned to 
improve the quality of training; the depth and length of assistance; and to 
ensure the support provided is both responsive to actual economic needs 
and circumstances and effective in reaching its goals.  
Second, governments should incorporate an Economic Development 
Chapter into trade agreements (Part II.B). Such a chapter would create 
international obligations on governments to provide their own citizens with 
the adjustment assistance discussed above. These obligations would be 
flexible, allowing governments to adopt policies appropriate to their 
national circumstances. But the obligations would also be enforceable 
through trade agreements’ dispute resolution process. A failure to provide 
adjustment assistance could thus lead to trade sanctions, effectively linking 
adjustment assistance policies to the trade liberalization that makes them 
necessary.13  
 Third, and most importantly, we propose a mechanism to fund these 
improvements (Part III). How we deliver and pay for adjustment assistance 
is a key means to addressing the domestic inequality effects of trade, and 
thereby restoring—or not—the domestic political consensus in favor of free 
trade. Absent a guaranteed funding stream, trade adjustment assistance is 
just another unfunded mandate. Trade liberalization redistributes economic 
resources within society, while the programs that seek to balance the 
impacts of this redistribution limp along with little to no impact.  
Specifically, we propose a new transnational funding mechanism, a 
TAA-earmarked financial transactions tax (FTT).  Such a tax would directly 
harness the wealth-creating potential of trade agreements and tie funding for 
                                                
11 See infra Part III.  
12 See infra Part III; see also Meyer, supra note 5.   
13 Meyer, supra note 5. One of us has also argued that we should eliminate the most 
egregious asymmetries that come from coercive or exploitative negotiations between states. 
See GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THREE TAKES supra 
note 7. 
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adjustment assistance to the financial parties most benefitting from the 
agreements themselves. Equally importantly, such a tax is politically 
feasible. The United States is currently debating a tax overall for the first 
time in thirty years and a major proposal from the Republican leadership 
aims to make the trading system fairer through the tax system.14 At the 
same time, the United States, Canada, and Mexico are renegotiating 
NAFTA, presenting a unique opportunity to use the tax system to restore 
faith in fair trade within North America. 
 
I.  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OF TRADE AND ITS BREACH  
 
A.  The Social Contract of Trade 
  
A free trade regime forms part of what John Rawls calls the basic 
structure of a society: a set of institutions, policies and practices that 
fundamentally shape the allocation of social resources and the life prospects 
of a community’s members.15 It is a choice towards a set of social 
arrangements that we hope collectively bring us the benefits of social and 
economic cooperation. Inherent in that choice, though, is the risk that these 
arrangements will also bring substantial costs, in the form of lost jobs or 
lost wages, for particular members of our society. For some, these economic 
losses may last their lifetimes. The social contract of trade, as we use the 
term, consists of our obligation towards those workers to hold them free 
from harm, or more precisely, to ensure they are no worse off than they 
would have been had we not undertaken a free trade policy.16 This 
obligation has deep roots in both liberal theory and economic justifications 
for free trade, which we briefly sketch here.  
 Within liberalism, Rawls has argued that the choice of basic social 
structures, such as a health care regime or trade policies, must meet the 
criteria of Justice as Fairness.17  Justice as Fairness does not require equality 
in terms of the allocation of resources, but only that, to be justified, any 
inequalities in the allocation of social resources benefit the least 
                                                
14 A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA (2016), 
https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf .  
15 In fact, Rawls considered free trade to be one of the policies that would be chosen in 
the Original Position (check if that is LOP or TOJ). 
16 Aaron James calls this our Collective Duty of Care, one of the three equitable 
principles he finds inherent in the collective social practice he calls mutual reliance on 
markets, or mutual market reliance for short.  AARON JAMES, FAIRNESS IN PRACTICE: A 
SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2012). 
17 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13–17 (1971). 
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advantaged.  This is the so-called Difference Principle,18 and its application 
to trade law is obvious and deeply intuitive. Studies—including an 
influential 2017 joint report from the WTO, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank—increasingly confirm that trade liberalization 
reallocates resources unequally within society.19 Practically speaking, the 
Difference Principle requires that workers whose life prospects are 
worsened by the inevitably unequal distributive effects of trade are entitled 
to social programs that help offset these effects, leaving them at least no 
worse off than if we had not embarked on a free trade regime at all. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, economists make a similar argument. 
Liberalizing trade, they argue, delivers such enormous benefits to society 
that trade should not be curtailed in the name of inequality.20 Instead, as 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman and IMF chief economist 
Maurice Obstfeldt argue, domestic adjustment assistance policies can more 
efficiently distribute the gains from trade.21 Pairing trade liberalization’s 
creation of wealth with domestic policies that fairly distribute that wealth 
ensures that everyone gains from trade. In so doing, such domestic policies 
can also lock in political support for trade liberalization.  
In short, the social contract of trade requires institutions and policies the 
protect those harmed by trade liberalization. Unfortunately, as our current 
political moment testifies, such policies are sorely lacking.  
 
B.  Breaking the Social Contract 
 
Throughout the world today, voters clearly view this social contract 
                                                
18 Social and economic inequalities are just “only if they result in compensating 
benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.” Id. at 
14–15. We are speaking here of the domestic form of the principle (and the early, less 
technical version), and not the many efforts made since then to formulate an international 
Difference Principle applicable to translational inequality issues. See, e.g., GARCIA, 
GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THREE TAKES, supra note 7, at 72–
81. 
19 International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization, MAKING 
TRADE AN ENGINE OF GROWTH FOR ALL: THE CASE FOR TRADE AND FOR POLICIES TO 
FACILITATE ADJUSTMENT (2017); see also ERA DABLA-NORRIS ET AL., CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF INCOME INEQUALITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2015); Francois 
Bourguignon, Inequality and Globalization: How the Rich Get Richer as the Poor Catch 
Up. FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2016. See generally Symposium, Frank J. Garcia, 
Globalization, Inequality & International Economic Law, 8 RELIGIONS 78 (2017). 
20 JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 25 (3d ed. 2016) (“One might support [trade] liberalization if 
one believes that the trading system is an inappropriate way to redistribute the gains from 
trade.”). 
21 Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND 
POLICY 221 (7th ed. 2005) 
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of trade as broken. During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, a number 
of polls indicated that opposition to free trade enjoyed significant support in 
both parties. For instance, a July 2016 poll found that, while most 
Americans do not feel strongly either way about trade agreements, those 
that do feel strongly tended to be against free trade by about a 3 to 1 margin, 
regardless of party affiliation.22 Similarly, a March 2016 Bloomberg poll 
asked voters about their views on a number of protectionist policies.23 Two-
thirds of respondents said that they would prefer an American-owned 
factory in the United States that created only one thousand jobs to a 
Chinese-owned factory that created two thousand jobs.24 Fully 82% of 
respondents said they would be willing to pay more for American-produced 
goods.25 And 44% of respondents said NAFTA had been bad for the 
American economy, against only 29% who viewed the agreement as a 
positive.26  
These views drove the success, or lack thereof, of presidential 
candidates. In the Democratic Party, Bernie Sanders’ anti-trade 
liberalization stance forced eventual nominee Hillary Clinton to abandon 
her prior support for the TPP. Donald Trump—who won the election by 
winning states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania that have lost 
significant numbers of manufacturing jobs—campaigned against NAFTA 
and TPP, calling them “the worst trade deal in the history of the country” 
and “a rape of our country,” respectively.27 In March 2016, 67% of Trump 
supporters and an astonishing 52% of Republicans—traditionally the party 
in favor of trade liberalization—expressed negative views of trade.28 
Similarly, an August 2017 poll found that only 34% of Republicans thought 
NAFTA was good for the United States, while 65% of Republicans thought 
                                                
22 Tobias Konitzer, Sam Corbett-Davies & David Rothschild, Who Cares About Free 
Trade? Not Many Americans, It Turns Out, WASH. POST (Jul. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/29/who-cares-about-
free-trade/?utm_term=.bff23582b1f4. 
23 John McCormick & Terrence Dopp, Free Trade Opposition Unites Political Parties 
in Bloomberg Poll, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-24/free-trade-opposition-unites-
political-parties-in-bloomberg-poll. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  
27 Elena Holodny, Trump Signs Executive Order on TPP, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 23, 
2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-signs-executive-order-on-tpp-2017-1.  
28 Bruce Stokes, Republicans, Especially Trump Supporters, see Free Trade 
Deals as Bad for U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 31, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/31/republicans-especially-
trump-supporters-see-free-trade-deals-as-bad-for-u-s/.  
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Mexico engaged in unfair trade practices.29 This distribution of sentiment is 
highly significant. Republicans control both houses of the U.S. Congress as 
well as the White House. Hence, even though polls often show general 
support for free trade among the general population, the views of 
Republican voters—especially in electorally decisive states such as 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio—have relatively greater policy 
influence.  
Similar viewpoints have found expression in elections throughout 
the developed world. Polling conducted after British voters chose to leave 
the European Union indicated that dissatisfaction with economic integration 
played a major role. 49% of those who voted to leave the EU said they did 
so primarily because regulations affecting the UK should be written in the 
UK, rather than Brussels.30 Another 33% supported leaving the EU in order 
to regain control of the UK’s borders. 47% of all respondents, no matter 
how they voted, felt the UK would be better off economically outside of the 
EU.31 All three of these viewpoints embody a rejection of the trade 
liberalization project at the center of European integration.  
Euro-skepticism is also alive and well on the Continent. Following 
the Brexit vote, Philip Cordery, a member of the French Parliament, 
remarked that “what happened in the UK at the referendum could have 
happened [in] almost every other country in the European Union.”32 Polls 
conducted in Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and Sweden have all found strong support for referenda on leaving 
the EU.33 Most recently, in September 2017, the Alternative for Germany 
party—a Euro-skeptic party, founded in 2013, in favor of reclaiming 
regulatory authority from Brussels—finished third in German elections, 
enough to give it a substantial number of seats in the German Bundestag.34 
The election marked the first time an “overtly right-wing party [has won] 
seats in the country’s federal parliament in over half a century.”35 
                                                
29 Dina Smeltz & Karen Whisler, Pro-Trade Views on the Rise, Partisan Divisions on 
NAFTA Widen, CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFF. (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/pro-trade-views-rise-partisan-divisions-
nafta-widen. 
30 Lord Ashcroft, How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday . . . and Why, LORD 
ASHCROFT POLLS (June 24, 2016), http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-
kingdom-voted-and-why/. 
31 Id.  
32 ‘Almost All EU States Could Follow UK, Leave Union’—French MP, RT (Sept. 27, 
2016, 7:11), https://www.rt.com/news/360762-french-mp-eu-members-exit/. 
33 See Meyer, supra note 5, at 999–1000.  
34 Amy Held & Simon Schuetz, Right-Wing Party Makes Strong Showing in German 
Elections, NPR (Sept. 24, 2017, 3:06), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/09/24/553290413/merkel-victorious-in-germany-s-national-election. 35	 Charles	 Hawley,	Merkel	 Re-Elected	 as	 Right	 Wing	 Enters	 Parliament,	 SPIEGEL	
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In response to this anti-free trade sentiment, European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker has recently proposed taking investment 
provisions out of EU trade deals.36 Under European rules, national and 
regional parliaments in the EU must approve investment protections, 
especially investor-state dispute settlement, while the EU Council can 
approve trade agreements without, as it were, asking back home. In 2016, 
the Parliament of Wallonia (a region of Belgium) nearly prevented the EU 
from entering a trade agreement with Canada.37 Juncker’s proposal aims to 
strip parliaments of their say over trade deals precisely to remove this threat 
of a minority veto over trade liberalization. In other words, Juncker believes 
that resistance to trade agreements in Europe is likely to persist and that, 
given how EU institutions operate, that resistance jeopardizes efforts at 
trade liberalization. 
 
II.  RESTORING THE POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF TRADE  
 
 It was not always thus. In 1962, the Trade Expansion Act gave birth 
to modern U.S. trade policy. At the core of the act was a bargain. The 
president would have the authority to negotiate reductions in trade barriers; 
in exchange, Congress created a program of trade adjustment assistance 
(TAA) designed to hold harmless workers in import-competing sectors.38 
Confidence in this bargain was so high that George Meany, head of the 
AFL-CIO, enthusiastically endorsed the Trade Expansion Act.39 Thus the 
modern social contract of trade was born. 
Benefits under this first-generation TAA were limited to training 
programs to promote re-employment, and some income support during the 
training period.  Eligibility under the Act was also much more limited than 
under contemporary TAA programs, and many of the initial applications 
were denied.40 By 1974, when Congress next revisited trade policy, support 
                                                                                                                       ONLINE	 (Sept.	 24,	 2017),	 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-election-merkel-wins-and-afd-wins-seats-in-parliament-a-1169587.html.	
36 Hans Von Der Burchard & Jakob Hanke, Juncker’s Risky Bid to Rescue EU Trade 
Policy, POLITICO (Sept. 12, 2017, 9:43), http://www.politico.eu/article/juncker-trade-sotu-
risky-bid-to-rescue-eu-trade-policy/.  
37 Id.  
38 President Kennedy made this bargain explicit when he announced the creation of 
TAA as part of the negotiation mandate for the new Kennedy Round of GATT 
negotiations. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Special Message to the 
Congress on Foreign Trade Policy (Jan. 25, 1962), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8688 (explaining that workers should not bear 
the full brunt alone of trade liberalization policies undertaken for the national good). 
39 Ethan Kapstein, Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment 
Assistance, 137 INT’L LAB. REV. 501, 507 (1998). 
40 Id. at 508. The first application accepted for benefits did not take place until 
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within organized labor for TAA had cratered, prompting Meany to dismiss 
TAA as nothing more than “burial insurance.”41 In the 1980s, the Reagan 
administration proposed abolishing TAA completely, and the program 
lapsed briefly.42  
Since then, the renewal of TAA has been tied to new rounds of trade 
negotiations. Congress has renewed or extended TAA each time it has 
granted the president trade promotion authority or approved a new round of 
trade agreements, reinforcing the connection between decisions to trade and 
decisions to compensate at-risk workers, but underscoring its political 
vulnerability as well. TAA has become a political football rather than a 
social contract. 
 
A.  Reforming TAA   	 	
 While the history of TAA demonstrates some efforts towards 
honoring trade’s social contract, the program as currently designed is 
widely considered a failure.43 Moreover, TAA funding in the U.S. has been 
fitful, limited, politically manipulated, and miniscule compared to 
adjustment assistance in other countries.  This is no way to honor a bargain. 
 The key to a successful TAA program is worker retraining towards 
sustainable re-employment.  Not all trade-displaced workers, of course, will 
need assistance finding comparable employment. Herein, however, lies the 
heart of the challenge. The average TAA claimant is older than other 
unemployed workers, has a narrower employment history, fewer marketable 
skills, and has worked in an industry unlikely to recover either locally or 
                                                                                                                       
November 1969. 
41 Id. at 509. 
42 J.F. Hornbeck, Trade Adjustment Assistance and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy 9, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 5, 2013). 
43 For a widely-cited study commissioned by the Department of Labor on the effects of 
the 2002 TAA reforms, see PETER Z. SCHOCHET ET AL., ESTIMATED IMPACTS FOR 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE (TAA) PROGRAM UNDER THE 2002 
AMENDMENTS (2012). Criticisms run the gamut from eligibility criteria to the certification 
process to the nature of the benefits offered and their effectiveness, and reform proposals 
are similarly varied and include everything from specific program and funding reforms to 
increased CIT oversight to transforming the entire program into a broad-based active labor 
market policy for all displaced workers. See GRANT D. ALDONAS ET AL., SUCCEEDING IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: A NEW POLICY AGENCY FOR THE AMERICAN WORKER (2007), 
https://financialservicesforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/20070626_succeeding_global_economy.pdf; Stephen Kim Park, 
Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 797 (2012); Shana Fried, Note, Strengthening the Role of the U.S. Court of 
International Trade in Helping Trade-Affected Workers, 58 Rutgers L. REV. 747 (2006). 
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regionally due to trade-related industrial shifts.44 These are the workers 
TAA has been created to help. But because they require more assistance 
transitioning to new jobs than their more flexible colleagues, they are also 
the workers our current TAA is especially poorly designed to assist. The 
key to remedying this state of affairs is through improving program design 
and program funding.    
 Current TAA offers support for worker training, including both 
classroom training and apprenticeship programs. However, studies suggest 
that the program has underperformed in terms of placing workers in new 
and adequate work.45 Data on current TAA effectiveness shows that when 
state training programs incentivize completion, do a better job of matching 
workers to jobs, or link classroom with on-the job training, then TAA skills 
training improves re-employment chances by as much as 11%.46 Further 
improving these success rates is both possible and cost-effective, but 
requires increased public investment and more careful program design.47 
Other OECD such as Sweden, Germany and Switzerland enjoy higher 
success rates (in some cases as high as 80-90% of workers re-employed 
within a year), reflecting both increased investment in worker retraining as a 
percentage of GDP, and a more effective training and apprenticeship 
process that better matches training to market needs, rewards early 
intervention (sometimes before unemployment even occurs), and offer more 
thorough and effective job counseling.48  
 Relocation support is the second key elements to effective re-
employment assistance, perhaps even more important than training.49 Even 
the most dynamic economic policy cannot ensure that new job opportunities 
appear in the same location as those lost. However, current law limits job 
search and relocation allowances to a lump sum of $1250. This is pitifully 
inadequate for finding new and equivalent work and moving a family in 
                                                
44 PETER Z. SCHOCHET ET AL., supra note 43, at 1–2; Park, supra note 43. 
45 JOOYOUN PARK, DOES OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING BY THE TRADE ADJUSTMENT 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REALLY HELP REEMPLOYMENT?: SUCCESS MEASURED AS 
MATCHING (2011) (claiming that 52% who received training did not appear to have found 
employment in the field of their training); Park, supra note 43 
. One cause appears to be a mismatch between the supply and demand of trainees, and 
suggests that training categories are poorly chosen. PARK, supra, at 1–2. 
46 PETER Z. SCHOCHET ET AL., supra note 43, at 4; PARK, supra, note 45. 
47 Jun Nie & Ethan Struby, Would Active Labor Market Policies Help Combat High 
U.S. Unemployment?, 2011 ECON. REV. 35 (citing data on positive unemployment effects 
of increased adjustment investment). 
48 These successful cases are being studied widely and are starting to be emulated in 
other OECD countries. See OECD, CONNECTING PEOPLE WITH JOBS: THE LABOUR 
MARKET, ACTIVATION POLICIES AND DISADVANTAGED WORKERS IN SLOVENIA 116–18 
(2016). 
49 Nie & Struby, supra note 47, at 45–46. 
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today’s economy of rising transportation costs and regional or nationwide 
job searches.50 Relocation support to help families successfully find and 
move to those new jobs should be increased beyond current nominal levels. 
 In terms of wage support, TAA currently provides 130 weeks, or 2.5 
years, of enhanced unemployment insurance if workers are in a 2-year 
training program, and limited wage support ($10,000 towards a $50,000 
cap) for under-reemployed older workers (those over 50). However, for 
those workers hardest hit (the low-skilled and older workers), these limits 
fails to recognize what they actually have to do to remake themselves for a 
new economy in which automation, not trade, accounts for the bulk of lost 
jobs, particularly given how poor current TAA job counseling and training 
programs are.  
 At a minimum, wage insurance benefit caps should be raised above 
current levels and broadened out beyond older workers, recognizing what a 
secure middle-class life costs in the U.S. today and how difficult it is for 
workers supporting families at all age groups to find equivalent post-
dislocation work.51 For example, a middle-aged manufacturing worker 
formerly supporting his or her family on $75,000 a year,52 who now must 
take a service industry job at $35,000 a year (less than half), can receive 
some support towards reaching a $50,000 wage, which is only two-thirds of 
prior wages. Without more public investment, TAA as configured will only 
ensure more families enter the “working poor” rather than continue in their 
“pre-trade” middle class life. 
 The bottom line is that, properly designed and implemented, active 
labor market policies such as TAA’s education, training, and relocation 
                                                
50 For example, assuming in a best-case scenario that finding the job costs noting, just 
renting even the smallest 10-foot U-Haul truck for a move from West Virginia (where 
unemployment is at 4.8%) to Colorado (where unemployment rates are less than half that) 
blows the budget, costing $1238 not including fuel. U-HAUL, 
https://www.uhaul.com/Trucks/ (search in “Pick Up Location” for “Charleston, WV”; then 
search in “Drop Off Location” for “Denver, CO”) (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). For the 
unemployment rates in West Virginia and Colorado, see Unemployment Rate - Seasonally 
Adjusted, GOOGLE PUBLIC DATA EXPLORER, 
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z1ebjpgk2654c1_&hl=en (select 
“Unemployment Rate”; then select “Colorado”; then select “West Virginia”) (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2017). 
51 The median U.S. income is approaching $60,000 a year, and survey data suggests 
this closely tracks what U.S. consumers feel is necessary for a “living wage” for middle 
class families today, and even this would not be enough in many parts of the U.S. Aimee 
Picchi, How Much Money do U.S. Families Need to Get By?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 26, 2015),  
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-much-money-do-us-families-need-to-get-by/. 
52 The median salary for a middle-class manufacturing job for a middle-aged worker. 
See Patrick Gillespie, $75 a day vs. $75,000 a year: How We Lost Jobs to Mexico, CNN 
(MAR. 31, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/31/news/economy/mexico-us-
globalization-wage-gap/index.html. 
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support are effective in reducing unemployment rates, are cost-effective in 
terms of net contributions to GDP, and could have a positive impact in the 
U.S. labor market.53 However, all of this takes money, and here we find 
TAA’s most spectacular failure.  
 Overall, there has been no effort to link funding levels to data on 
levels of demand or need for the program.54 As a result, TAA funding has 
consistently been set too low for program needs, and has fluctuated due to 
political trends rather than political commitments. For example, the most 
recent TAA reauthorization was in 2015, extending TAA through 2021 and 
capping the annual funding at $450 million, a reduction from the amounts 
authorized in 2009 and 2011.   
 In comparative terms, the U.S. is consistently near the bottom of all 
OECD countries in terms of adjustment spending, reflecting the fact that the 
U.S. is also near the bottom of all OECD states in overall labor market 
policy spending, and in the relative percentage of that spending devoted to 
active labor market policies, the most effective component.55 Paradoxically, 
at a time in which the need has never been greater, the resource allocations 
diminish.  This has repercussions through all areas of program design and 
implementation, since an effective TAA program requires meaningful 
public investment.  We shall return to this theme in Part III. 
 
B.  Internationalizing Domestic Trade Adjustment  	
Obtaining sufficient adjustment assistance faces another 
impediment. Unlike the trade liberalization policies that make TAA 
necessary, free trade agreements do not require governments to adopt any 
adjustment assistance policies. Consequently, international trade law 
pressures states to liberalize their economies without providing any similar 
pressure to provide the adjustment assistance that makes trade liberalization 
politically sustainable. To correct this deficiency, governments should 
enshrine adjustment assistance commitments directly in their trade 
agreements. This could be done in the form of an “Economic Development” 
chapter within trade agreements. An Economic Development chapter would 
have two key features. 56  
                                                
53 Nie & Struby, supra note 47, at 43, 48, 51–54. 
54 Park, supra note 43, at 847–48. 
55 Nie & Struby, supra note 47, at 41 (demonstrating that the U.S. is third from the 
bottom of 21 OECD countries studied); OECD, Active Labour Market Policies: 
Connecting People with Jobs, http://www.oecd.org/employment/activation.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2017) (demonstrating that the US currently ranks third from the bottom among the 
35 OECD countries in its level of TAA as a percentage of GDP, ahead of only Mexico and 
Chile). 
56 For a greater exposition as to what an Economic Development chapter might look 
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First, it would require states to spend a certain amount of money on 
programs designed to assist those hurt by trade liberalization. This amount 
should be established against a baseline amount of spending, such that 
governments commit to spending “new money.” This requirement ensures 
that governments do not simply count programs that already exist but 
instead make a meaningful commitment to provide additional assistance. 
The spending requirements should be indexed so that they rise and fall with 
the degree of economic harm suffered as a result of trade liberalization. 
Amending trade agreements is difficult, so this indexing—which could be 
done in a number of different ways—ensures that the Economic 
Development chapter continues to require financial assistance when it is 
necessary. Equally importantly, if the gains from trade are distributed 
evenly, the indexing would ensure that the obligation to provide assistance 
naturally sunsets.  
Second, the Economic Development Chapter would provide 
significant flexibility to states in terms of the kinds of programs that would 
qualify. Domestic TAA programs would, for instance, certainly count. But 
greater spending on a general social safety net should qualify also. So too 
would additional spending on education and investment in infrastructure, 
two areas in which public investment can most directly create economic 
opportunity. Indeed, these latter two priorities are already reflected in a 
“Development” chapter in the TPP.57 The Economic Development chapter 
we call for here uses TPP’s Development chapter, already agreed to by 
negotiators from twelve countries, as a model, although it greatly expands it 
by requiring the imposition of binding spending commitments.   
The benefits of an Economic Development Chapter would be 
several. Most importantly, an Economic Development Chapter would 
provide an international enforcement mechanism that would help ensure 
that individual nations honor their commitment to help those harmed by 
trade liberalization. The development obligations should be subject to the 
same state-to-state enforcement procedures as the rest of a trade agreement, 
including existing chapters on labor and environmental standards. As a 
result, if a nation failed to honor its development obligations, it could be 
subject to retaliation by other members and the suspension of concessions 
equal to the level of benefits the government failed to provide.58  
                                                                                                                       
like, see Meyer, supra note 5, at 1012–23. 
57 TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT ch. 23, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Development.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 
2017) 
58 See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 22.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Aneex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (“The level of the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification 
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One might reasonably ask why Mexico, for instance, would bring a 
trade case because the United States failed to implement domestic TAA 
provisions that benefit U.S. workers. To be sure, it seems unlikely that 
many nations would bring many cases in order to assist foreign workers. 
But it isn’t impossible to imagine. In 2011, for example, the United States 
brought a case under the Central American Free Trade Agreement against 
Guatemala for labor violations that Guatemala committed against its own 
workers.59 That case, and the greater enforcement of labor and 
environmental rights it represented, reflected part of the political bargain 
known as the “May 10th Consensus,” a 2007 deal between the George W. 
Bush administration and Congress that led to the approval of a number of 
21st century trade agreements.60  Enforcement, in other words, could be—
and likely will be in future trade agreements—part of the bargain necessary 
to approve new trade agreements domestically. 
States might also view bringing development cases as in their own 
self-interest for a number of reasons. A Mexican case against the United 
States might benefit Mexican-Americans, while a similar case by the United 
States against Mexico might improve working conditions in Mexico and 
thereby stem illegal immigration into the United States. Trade cases are also 
often brought on a tit-for-tat basis, with a trade case by Country A against 
Country B prompting a case by Country B against Country A. In this 
context, a nation might bring a development case purely for leverage in 
negotiations. Despite this cynical motive, though, the case could still lead to 
higher levels of adjustment assistance.  
Beyond enforcement, the Economic Development Chapter would 
create a committee charged with gathering data on communities, regions, 
and sectors of member states’ economies adversely affected by trade. 
Indeed, the Development chapter in the TPP already creates such a 
committee.61 Members would also report to the committee the measures 
they have taken to comply with their development obligations. This softer 
monitoring effort would resemble the reporting and monitoring mechanisms 
under human rights treaties. While it would not result in sanctions, it 
provides information and feedback that nudge states to take greater action.  
                                                                                                                       
or impairment.”). 
59 In 2017, the panel ruled against the United States. See In re. Guatemala –– Issues 
Relating to the Oglibations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, Final Report of the 
Panel (2017), https://www.trade.gov/industry/tas/Guatemala%20%20–
%20Obligations%20Under%20Article%2016-2-1(a)%20of%20the%20CAFTA-
DR%20%20June%2014%202017.pdf. 
60 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL (2007), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ 9EM9-RHDP]. 
61 TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, supra note 59, at art. 23.7. 
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* * * 
 
Contemporary TAA falls short in two ways. It inadequately funds 
and supports those workers who require it the most. It also faces structural 
impediments. Free trade agreements require trade liberalization but not the 
adjustment assistance that liberalization makes necessary. Mandating 
expanded adjustment assistance through an Economic Development 
Chapter goes a long way towards addressing these shortcomings. 
 
III. FUNDING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OF TRADE: A FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTION TAX IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
 Designing better adjustment assistance policies is at best half the 
challenge, however. Whether operationalized at the domestic level, the 
treaty level, or both, we need to guarantee funding for adjustment assistance 
in a manner consistent with its overall role in the social contract. The 
history of adjustment assistance demonstrates that even the best policies 
will fail if not properly funded. We argue that, as a promise from all of us to 
those most at risk from free trade, free trade agreements themselves should 
require funding domestic adjustment assistance programs.  This can be 
accomplished by incorporating a financial transactions tax (FTT) into all 
new or renegotiated trade agreements, starting with the current NAFTA 
renegotiations. As we explain below, an FTT, with revenue earmarked for 
adjustment assistance, would place those entities that benefit most from 
trade liberalization—major financial institutions—in the role of assisting 
those who suffer most from the same.62    
 
A.   How an FTT works 
 
 FTT proposals are not new. In 2009, following the Great Recession, 
the G20 tasked the IMF with examining “the range of options countries 
have adopted or are considering as to how the financial sector could make a 
fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated 
with government interventions to repair the banking system.”63 In response, 
                                                
62 For an earlier call to shift TAA funding to a transnational model, see Park, supra 
note 43, at 862 (arguing that the TAA should be delivered by transnational worker 
payments through a global adjustment fund supported by state budgetary contributions). 
However, Park’s model failed to link TAA support directly to the trade benefits enjoyed by 
others. 
63IMF, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector, Final Report for 
the G-20 (June 2010).  
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the IMF produced a 2010 study that surveyed the existing literature on 
taxing financial activities, including mechanisms such as a “Tobin” tax on 
currency transactions, an FTT on the sale of securities, and a global 
resource tax.64 More recently, in his magisterial 2014 study Capital in the 
21st Century, Thomas Piketty offered the most recent comprehensive 
proposal in the form of a global tax on wealth.65 
A number of these mechanisms have been adopted or proposed 
around the globe. For instance, large financial centers such as Hong Kong, 
Mumbai and Seoul currently have FTTs in place, collectively raising £12 
billion per year.66 In Europe, ten EU member countries (Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 
have announced plans to implement an FTT to help states recoup some of 
the losses from the many bailouts within Europe.67 Members of the U.S. 
Congress—including Senator Bernie Sanders, whose views on international 
trade closely resemble President Trump’s—have repeatedly proposed and 
introduced legislation to implement an FTT in recent years.68   
                                                
64 STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION: THE IMF’S REPORT TO THE 
G-20 AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL (2010). The ‘grandfather’ of transnational taxation 
schemes is the Tobin tax, proposed in 1972 by Nobel-prize winning economist James 
Tobin. He proposed an internationally agreed uniform tax on all currency market 
transactions in order to “throw sand in the wheels” of global finance, discouraging currency 
speculation by making short-term financial movements uneconomical. Each government 
would levy the tax and pay the proceeds towards a global financial body such as the World 
Bank or IMF, and that the revenue raised be used as economic and social aid for 
developing countries. See James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 
EASTERN ECON. J. 153, 153–59 (1978); see also THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY (2008); 
Ross P. Buckley, A Financial Transactions Tax: The One Essential Reform, 47 
INTERECONOMICS: REV. EUROPEAN ECON. POL’Y 99 (2012); Paula Casal, Global Taxes on 
Natural Resources, 8 J. MORAL PHIL. 353 (2011); Christopher L. Culp, Financial 
Transaction Taxes: Benefits and Costs (Compass Lexecon Study for Virtu Management 
LLC, 2010). 
65 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY 515–34 (2014). 
66 A form of the Tobin Tax was adopted as a means to stabilize these markets in 
response to high frequency trading. Charles Li, Chief Executive of Hong Kong’s stock 
exchange has said that such a tax “effectively limits high frequency trading, just like a 
highway with many toll booths discourages speeding.” Jeremy Grant, HKEx Reveals 
‘Urgent’ Plan to Remain Competitive, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2011), 
https://www.ft.com/content/326818c2-b935-11e0-b6bb-00144feabdc0 .  
67 The European proposal would apply to shares and bonds, and derivatives on shares 
and bonds, with a proposed tax rate of 0.1% on shares and bonds, and a 0.01% tax rate on 
derivatives of shares and bonds. The tax is projected to raise more than 30 billion euros by 
2020 and possibly up to fifty billion euros if currency transactions are included, and the 
revenue from the tax would go to the general EU budget. See Europe Rejects UK’s 
Financial Transaction Tax Challenge, BBC (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27218615. 
68 See, e.g., S. 1787, 112th Cong. (2011); Jim Zarroli, How Bernie Sanders’ Wall 
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In general, these FTTs are small taxes of 0.01% to 0.1% on different 
kinds of financial activities. For instance, the proposals in both the EU and 
the United States would tax securities transactions. Typically, the tax is 
imposed on any transaction in which at least one party is located in the 
taxing jurisdiction.  
A comprehensive review of the extensive literature on FTTs is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but the underlying policy rationales are 
worth noting briefly. First, FTTs make trading slightly more expensive, 
which has two effects. These higher costs can discourage risk-taking, 
particularly high-frequency trading that can lead to market volatility.69 
Moreover, when imposed at the national level, FTTs also raise the 
possibility that financial transactions will move offshore to avoid taxation. 
After all, capital is highly mobile.  
Second, and most importantly for our purposes, FTTs raise revenue. 
Usually, policymakers tie the use of this revenue to addressing specific risks 
created by the financial system or, as noted above, to compensating the 
public fisc for bailing out the financial sector. The congressional Joint 
Committee on Taxation, for instance, estimated the proposed FTT in the 
United States would have raised $180 billion between 2015 and 2023.70 An 
FTT tied to free trade agreements could thus raise hundreds of millions or 
even billions of dollars for adjustment assistance.  
 
B.  Funding Adjustment Assistance Through an FTT 
 
 Our innovation is to use the revenue from an FTT to address a 
different kind of systemic risk: the risk to the global trading system from 
economic inequality and the resulting political unrest. This risk imperils all 
who benefit from globalization, from ordinary consumers to the financial 
companies that reap millions in profits from trading stock. Specifically, we 
propose that parties to a free trade agreement agree that each party shall 
impose an incremental tax on specified financial transactions (such as 
speculative securities, derivatives or currency trades) of anywhere from 
0.01% to 0.1% (the rate to be the same in each member state).  This is not 
enough to discourage productive investment transactions, yet it is enough to 
generate hundreds of millions for adjustment assistance for workers sharing 
                                                                                                                       
Street Tax Would Work, NPR (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/12/466465333/sanders-favors-a-speculation-tax-on-big-wall-
street-firms-what-is-that. 
69 Ross P. Buckley & Gill North, A Financial Transactions Tax: Inefficient or Needed 
Systemic Reform? 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 745, 750 (2012).  
70 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2014 TO 
2023 172 (2013). 
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the risks but not getting the benefits of trade’s joint venture.   
 The creation of any tax raises complex economic, political, 
normative and technical issues, and we can only sketch the outlines of such 
a proposal here.71 First, the complexity of modern finance requires detailed, 
careful yet clear delineation of the scope of any tax on financial 
transactions. In general the FTT should be designed to tax wholesale capital 
market transactions (stocks, bonds, derivatives and currency trades) 
between major financial institutions such as banks, investment firms, 
insurance companies, pension funds, and hedge funds; and not “retail” 
transactions such as home mortgages and business loans.72 It is important 
for political as well as normative reasons that the tax not apply to ordinary 
consumers at the retail level.  For similar reasons, the EU’s FTT proposal 
exempts IPOs, and we do as well, to make it clear that the FTT would have 
no impact on raising productive capital.73  However, the EU proposal has 
been criticized for excluding currency trades, and we propose including 
them here.74   
 Jurisdictionally, taxable transactions could be defined as those 
between counterparties when at least one counterparty is resident within the 
free trade area, as the EU does.  However, in the context of free trade 
agreements, thought should be given to whether it should be required that 
both counterparties are resident.  This would reduce the scope (and yield) of 
the tax, but could strengthen the normative case in favor of it and minimize 
some of the externality objections.75 Either way, given the flexibility of 
modern finance, jurisdictional rules must be carefully drawn to avoid 
circumvention by offshoring, for example by requiring the counterparty to 
pay the tax appropriate to its residence regardless of the location of the 
                                                
71 For an instructive analysis of some of the technical issues, see FTT –– Collection 
Methods and Data Requirements (Oct. 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/oth
er_taxes/financial_sector/ftt_final_report.pdf. For a quick overview of policy issues and 
common misconceptions, see Buckley, supra note 64. 
72 See generally Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, at 36 (Feb. 14, 2013), 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/co
m_2013_71_en.pdf.  
73 Id. 
74 CARSTEN SIELING, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TAX: 
SENSIBLE, FEASIBLE, OVERDUE (2012), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/09063.pdf.  
Tobin’s original proposal was specifically aimed at such transactions, for what we consider 
good reasons. 
75 Particularly when the FTA zone would include a major financial center such as New 
York in the case of a US FTA, or the City in the case of an EU or (potentially) UK FTA, it 
is easy to object that applying the tax when only one counterparty is resident risks an 
unjustifiably large tax base. 
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actual trade.76  
 Even with such jurisdictional and scope limitations, such a tax could 
generate considerable revenue towards funding TAA obligations. The EU 
Commission calculated that its earlier 2011 FTT proposal could generate as 
much as 57 billion Euro with a tax rate of 0.1% on all wholesale stock and 
bond transfers and 0.01% on all derivatives trades, with all 27 Member 
States participating.77 An FTT with the same tax rate and jurisdictional 
structure, if applied in the NAFTA zone today, could yield as much as $64 
billion USD towards adjustment costs in the NAFTA area.78 To put this in 
perspective, the combined annual budget for all active labor market 
policies, TAA included, among the U.S., Canada and Mexico totaled $25 
billion USD in 2015.79  Not only would an FTA-based FTT cover the cost 
of TAA as currently configured, but it would also allow for the necessary 
reforms and expansions without burdening the public. 
We recognize that other versions of an FTT are possible and might, 
for various reasons, be politically more feasible. For instance, services such 
as financial sector services are generally taxed at a lower rate than goods.80 
                                                
76 This is the EU’s approach.  Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing 
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 72. Other 
issues to be resolved include whether the FTT should include secondary trades of 
instruments issued within the FTA zone, the so called “residence + issuance” rule in the 
EU FTT.  Id.  However the jurisdictional questions are ultimately determined, they must 
also be clear or the tax risks confusion.  See FTT –– Collection Methods and Data 
Requirements, supra note 71, at 14 (arguing that the Italian FTT is unclear as to 
counterparty status, creating inefficiencies). 
77 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial 
Transaction Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC, SEC (2011) 1102–03 final (Sept. 28, 
2011).  This would calculate to a tax yield of 0.3% of total EU nominal GDP for 2011 
(18.3 trillion Euro), using GDP as a proxy for the tax base, although other measures such as 
total EU volume of wholesale capital market transactions could be more accurate. 
European Union GDP, TRADING ECONOMICS, https://tradingeconomics.com/european-
union/gdp (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
78 Assuming the same 0.3% calculation on a 2016 combined NAFTA GDP of $21.4 
trillion USD. Report for Selected Countries and Subjects, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2016&ey=201
6&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=subject&ds=.&br=1&c=273,156,111&s=NGDPD,PPPGDP,LP&
grp=0&a=&pr.x=53&pr.y=13 (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). Apportionment of these revenues 
would of course have to be worked out among the FTA participants.  
79 Public Expenditure and Participant Stock on LMP, OECD, 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LMPEXP# (click on “Customise”; then 
hover over “Selection . . .”; then click on “Measure”; then select “Public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP”; then click “View Data”) (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
80 Michael Keen, Russell Krelove & John Norregaard, The Financial Activities Tax in 
FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION: THE IMF’S REPORT TO THE G-20 AND BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL, supra note 64, at 122–23 (noting the “under-taxation” of the financial services 
sector). 
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An increased tax on the provision of financial services generally might help 
level the playing field between that sector and the manufacturing sector that 
the Trump Administration in particular has focused on rescuing.  Another 
alternative would be to tax commercial real estate transactions by foreign or 
foreign-owned entities. The primary advantage of such a tax is that real 
estate cannot flee to another jurisdiction.81 A real estate transaction tax 
would also impose a one-time cost on companies acquiring property for 
foreign operations, a politically advantageous feature that would do little to 
distort the markets for goods and services produced on such real estate.   
Whatever version of an FTT is imposed, embedding it in a free trade 
agreement like NAFTA can address the problem of capital mobility. Like 
any tax, FTTs can cause productive activity to relocate to jurisdictions with 
lower tax rates. Imposing an identical tax through an international 
agreement can reduce this incentive. A party could not avoid the tax simply 
by relocating to another country within the free trade area. Consider, for 
instance, the example of securities traded on North American stock 
exchanges. The United States is, of course, home to the world’s two largest 
stock exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. Canada 
and Mexico also have significant stock exchanges, however. The Toronto 
Stock Exchange is the third largest in the Americas and ninth largest in the 
world, while Mexico’s largest exchange, Mexbol, is the second largest 
exchange in Latin America. Covering the entire NAFTA region thus 
ensures a very tax broad base and reduces the risk of capital flight. 
Expanding the tax in subsequent trade agreements will further reduce the 
risk of capital flight.  
The last issue we address is how the tax revenue generated by an 
FTT should be allocated. One principle, of course, would be to simply allow 
each country to keep the revenue it generates within its own borders. Under 
this approach, the primary value of including the FTT in a trade agreement 
would be 1) to equalize the tax across nations participating in the agreement 
to reduce capital flight, and 2) to use the international agreement to create a 
credible commitment to devote the resulting revenue to adjustment 
assistance. 
 Precedent exists, however, for a more cooperative approach. When 
NAFTA was created, the United States and Mexico created the North 
American Development Bank (NADB). The two governments fund the 
bank through “subscriptions” to shares of the bank’s stock.82 The Bank, in 
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turn, finances and oversees the implementation of projects “to preserve and 
enhance environmental conditions and the quality of life of people living 
along the U.S.-Mexican border.”83 Some (or all) of the tax revenue raised 
through an FTT could be devoted to a development bank with a broader 
mandate: to finance projects and assistance programs throughout the free 
trade area. The bank could be directed to expend funds within the region in 
proportion to criteria tied to the effects of trade.84 For instance, funding 
could be tied to estimates of job losses in each country stemming from the 
trade agreement or, perhaps, trade deficits among the parties.85 
 However implemented and allocated, our FTT proposal represents a 
breakthrough in trade adjustment financing and, more broadly, in 
mechanisms to address the social costs and inequality effects of trade.  
Linking such a tax to transactions within the economic zones that free trade 
agreements create would directly harness their wealth-creating potential and 
tie the funding for TAA to the financial parties most benefitting from the 
agreements themselves. Such a mechanism is rooted directly in the social 
contract of trade itself, and not more general calls for transnational wealth 
redistribution, however justified (or not) the latter may be for other reasons. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The time has come for an free trade-linked FTT to stabilize and improve 
adjustment assistance funding.  Politically, such an initiative could garner 
bipartisan support in the United States and perhaps other jurisdictions as 
well. Supporters of trade liberalization could see businesses again enjoying 
the benefits of open markets and fairer rules around the world, for only the 
cost of an invisible increment. Supporters of labor—traditionally Democrats 
but increasingly Republicans as well—would for the first time see a truly 
adequate benefits package for workers as a condition of opening markets, 
but one funded progressively from those financial parties benefitting 
directly from trade liberalization itself, and not the general public. 
 Most importantly, workers would feel properly supported, rather 
than betrayed. If, as the Trump Administration has declared, every decision 
on trade will be made to benefit American workers and American families, 
enacting a trade-related FTT should be easy.  Increasing our commitment to 
                                                
83 Id.  
84 Such direction could be either formal, in the bank’s charter, or informal, as with the 
allocation of governance responsibility in many international organizations. See Jacob Katz 
Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organizations: The Operational 
Constitution and its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209 (2009).  
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adjustment assistance programs—and finding a way to fund them 
appropriately—is a way to fulfill that promise, restore that contract, and 
deliver true and sustainable long-term economic growth and prosperity for 
all.   
 
 
